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ABSTRACT 
On any given day, news sources are packed with information on the various 
negotiations going on throughout the world in an attempt to resolve an ongoing dispute. 
Typically, nation-states enter into negotiations as a final attempt to resolve their 
differences in a diplomatic forum rather than resorting to combative retaliation. These 
negotiations can be protracted and tenuous, especially when the disputing parties come 
from different cultures. This thesis asserts that all too often, culture is a neglected aspect 
of conflict resolution. Cultural mismatch and misunderstanding are additional 
confounding factors that complicate communication and create misperceptions that 
sometimes hinder finding a mutually acceptable compromise. This is especially true 
when an external third party, often from another cultural background, is added to mediate 
between the conflicting parties. When all parties approach negotiations with a clear 
understanding of the impact of cross-cultural understanding and communication on the 
conflict resolution process, the parties might find negotiations are smoother and 
resolution comes easier. 
This thesis attempts to merge two fields of study that, until now, have been left 
largely separate in the academic community and largely understudied: conflict resolution 
and cross-cultural communication. The overall question that this thesis seeks to address 
is: What is the role of culture in the conflict resolution process, specifically, in 
international negotiations? The thesis begins by laying out the conceptual foundation of 
both conflict resolution and culture/cross-cultural communication. We will then build on 
existing theory from conflict resolution and culture and attempt to merge and expand on 
them in order to draw up a model with indicators of cultural match / mismatch in 
international negotiation scenarios. Afterwards, we will apply this model to US-China 
relations, first assessing the amount of mismatch and then examining two cases, the 1999 
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the negotiations surrounding the EP3 
incident in 2001. They confirm that indeed negotiations are greatly complicated by a 
large amount of cultural mismatch, even though further, more rigorous studies are 
warranted to refine the model. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
Imagine a scenario if you will. As one of five representatives from the United 
States attending negotiations with Chinese businessmen, you are led into a conference 
room where the negotiations will take place. You see that there are a few seats empty in 
the center of their side of the table. You are directed to sit along the opposite side of the 
table and told that the leader of the Chinese delegation will arrive shortly. After almost an 
hour of waiting, your delegation grows impatient and is starting to show their frustration 
by continually checking their watch and sighing aloud. Finally the leader of the Chinese 
delegation arrives and suggests they share something to eat before beginning 
negotiations. Since the American delegation has already been waiting for close to an 
hour, they insist on beginning negotiations right away. 
Although a benign example taken from the business world, this narrative gives 
examples of how both sides could have been more culturally sensitive to their 
counterparts thereby enabling a better start to negotiations. Punctuality is very important 
to Americans. Tardiness is perceived as rudeness and arrogance. On the other hand, 
sharing a meal is considered key to any negotiation as it gives delegation members on 
both sides a chance to get to know one another, thereby easing tensions before 
negotiations even begin. Declining the invitation could be perceived as the American 
delegation trying to take the upper hand and being unbending. In the end, this 
demonstration of cultural misunderstanding might inadvertently ruin negotiation attempts 
before they had even begun. We will revisit this example at the conclusion of the thesis to 
demonstrate how concepts and principles examined in the thesis would impact this 
scenario. 
On any given day, news sources are packed with information on the various 
negotiations going on throughout the world in an attempt to resolve an ongoing dispute. 
Typically, nation-states enter into negotiations as a final attempt to resolve their 
differences in a diplomatic forum rather than resorting to combative retaliation. These 
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negotiations can be protracted and tenuous, especially when the disputing parties come 
from different cultures. This thesis asserts that all too often, culture is a neglected aspect 
of conflict resolution. Cultural mismatch and misunderstanding are additional 
confounding factors that complicate communication and create misperceptions that 
sometimes hinder finding a mutually acceptable compromise. This is especially true 
when an external third party, often from another cultural background, is added to mediate 
between the conflicting parties. When all parties approach negotiations with a clear 
understanding of the impact of cross-cultural understanding and communication on the 
conflict resolution process, the parties might find negotiations are smoother and 
resolution comes easier. 
This thesis will attempt to merge two fields of study that, until now, have been 
left largely separate in the academic community and largely understudied: conflict 
resolution and cross-cultural communication. The overall question that this thesis seeks to 
address is: What is the role of culture in the conflict resolution process, specifically, in 
international negotiations. It is a rather broad question that first of all aims at getting an 
overview as to the major effects of culture on conflict resolution, which is a prerequisite 
for further in-depth studies.  
The thesis will begin with laying out the conceptual foundation of both conflict 
resolution and culture/cross-cultural communication. I will mainly concentrate on 
negotiations in international relations and also touch upon international mediation, as one 
major activity in the conflict resolution field. This discussion will start out with 
conceptualizing key terms and theories associated with both fields of study, which are 
then merged to come up with a model of how to test cultural match among negotiation 
partners. Once this conceptualization is accomplished, we will examine two cases that 
test my major hypothesis and the model. Lastly, this thesis will examine how a better 
understanding of culture and cross-cultural communication can positively enhance the 
conflict resolution process. 
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B. IMPORTANCE  
The basic assumption of this thesis is that the significance of culture in conflict 
resolution is still politically underrated and academically under-explored, with the effect 
that negotiations fail and opportunities for successful international mediation are missed. 
The concepts examined in this thesis have numerous applications throughout 
international relations. First and foremost, this thesis is an awareness-raising endeavor. It 
intends to raise awareness as to why it is so crucial to incorporate culture into the 
negotiation and mediation process. The findings of this thesis will contribute 
academically to the study of this topic that is expanding but still in its infancy. Scholars 
began to sense the importance of this topic in recent years and began to study what is 
often called “negotiation across cultures.”1  
Politically, I hope to draw conclusions on how parties can improve their 
negotiation strategies in any cross-cultural negotiation scenario. Representatives to 
international organizations could even apply the lessons learned from this study to the 
communications within their organizations, as these organizations (like the United 
Nations or the IAEA) themselves are comprised of nationals of different cultural 
backgrounds and may disagree on how to address the conflicts they are trying to resolve. 
As an example, cultural differences have proven to be a serious impediment in 
multinational peace support operations like UN “blue helmet” peacekeeping. Individual 
governments could also use the conclusions in this thesis as a means of improving their 
negotiation strategies when dealing with their counterparts in foreign governments. 
Representatives could apply them directly when acting as an individual mediator in an 
ongoing conflict. One might also consider that the findings of this thesis could be used, if 
applied early on in the conflict cycle, to avoid certain cross-cultural conflicts all together. 
 
                                                 
1 Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures; International Communication in an Independent 
World, United States Institute of Peace Press, (Washington, D.C., 1997), 10-14. 
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C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology to be used in this thesis will be deductive in nature. I will first 
build on existing theory from conflict resolution and culture, attempt to merge them and 
to expand on them to get to the theoretical foundation of my thesis, which conceptualizes 
inter-cultural communication in international negotiation scenarios. Once I have arrived 
at this concept, I will conduct a plausibility probe of my concept. Alexander George and 
Andrew Bennett define this as “a preliminary study on relatively untested theories and 
hypotheses to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted.”2 I 
will attempt to establish whether this concept and the preliminary hypotheses can be 
applied and hold up in a case study. At the end, I will interpret the results of this case 
study analysis to refine my concept. The conclusions will thus contain some theoretical 
findings, policy recommendations, and recommendations for future research. Overall, the 
aim is to come up with a modest building block for a future theory of inter-cultural 
communication in international negotiations. 
To test my hypotheses, I have chosen revealing episodes in the negotiations 
between the United States and China; the 1999 Bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade and the 2001 EP-3 Incident. We will use the negotiations and public rhetoric of 
the U.S. and China surrounding these events to illustrate and test my hypotheses. For 
simplification purposes and easy demonstration of the ideas we have put forth, this thesis 
will focus only on the negotiations between the U.S. and China as they offer a most likely 
case of maximum cultural mismatch between the parties involved.3 
My dependent variable is the negotiating behavior of the actors involved. The 
independent variables in this study are the cultures of the actors involved. Intervening 
variables include but are not limited to relationships and agreements with other actors or 
interested parties outside the dispute, global political and economic pressures and trends, 
and domestic politics of the actors involved.  
                                                 
2 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, MIT Press (2005, Cambridge, MA), 74-76. 
3 Ibid. 
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II. CONFLICT RESOLUTION – NEGOTIATION AND 
MEDIATION 
In a world of seemingly ever-increasing and never-ending international conflict, 
the ability to effectively resolve conflict is a critical skill the nations of the world must 
master in order to live in harmony with their neighbors and counterparts. Having learned 
many historical lessons on the effectiveness and benefits of non-violent conflict 
resolution, many nations are coming to the negotiating table early in order to avoid the 
mass casualties suffered in the past. Others, however, have not learned these lessons, or 
the issues they face are just too demanding to come to a negotiated settlement. 
Negotiations then easily reach a dead end. Mediation has proven to be an effective tool to 
enhance the chances of conflict management.  
A.  DEFINITIONS 
In order to avoid confusion, let us begin by defining what we mean by the terms 
negotiation and mediation. Webster’s dictionary defines negotiation in the following 
manner; “to confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter”4 This 
rather simplistic view of negotiation is a good foundation that is quickly complicated 
when analyzing the intricacies of the actual interactions of the actors involved in 
negotiations. I. William Zartman asserts that negotiations occur when the disputing 
parties are “left to themselves to combine their conflicting points of view into a single 
decision.”5 Daniel Druckman builds upon Webster’s definition of negotiation by 
describing it as communications between two or more nations that seek to come to an 
agreement of a dispute by negotiating either face-to-face or from a distance.6 He adds 
that they may concern matters in a great variety of issue areas that may have local, 
                                                 
4 Merriam-Webster On-line Dictionary, Negotiate, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/negotiate, 
(accessed 2 December 2007). 
5 I. William Zartman, “Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process,” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, vol. 21, no. 4, December 1977: 619-638. 
6 Daniel Druckman, “Negotiation in the International Context,” Peacemaking in International 
Conflict; Methods and Techniques, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., United States 
Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1997: 81. 
 6
regional, or even global implications.7 Fred Iklé defines negotiation as “an exchange of 
proposals ostensibly for the purpose of reaching an agreement.”8 These negotiations do 
not necessarily need to be the face-to-face meetings that we might normally think of. 
They can also occur in private caucuses “behind closed doors,” via letters or telephone 
calls between the leaders of the parties involved (both official and unofficial), or even via 
public rhetoric exchanged in the media. Kolb and Babbitt note that “caucuses serve 
obvious instrumental purposes; they are a place to ventilate hostility, and are associated 
with enhanced problem-solving activity.”9 For the purposes of this thesis, we will take 
the term negotiation to mean discussions between two or more disputing parties in an 
attempt to resolve an unsettled dispute. Mediation, on the other hand, transforms the 
negotiation structure all together. 
The major difference is that mediation introduces a third party into the conflict 
resolution process. The third-party intervention is political and aims to resolve or 
“referee” a dispute. Jacob Bercovitch defines mediation as a form of conflict 
management whereby disputants seek the assistance of or accept advice from “an 
outsider, a third party not directly a disputant,” to settle their differences without 
resorting to violence or invoking the authority of law.10 Saadia Touval and I. William 
Zartman define mediation as “an intervention acceptable to the adversaries, who 
cooperate diplomatically with the intervener.” It “is not based on the direct use of fore 
and it is not aimed at helping one of the participants to win.”11 They go on to note that in 
essence mediators are part of a political process in which the mediator may recommend 
                                                 
7 Daniel Druckman, “Negotiation in the International Context,” Peacemaking in International 
Conflict; Methods and Techniques, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., United States 
Institute of Peace, (Washington, D.C., 1997), 81. 
8 Fred C. Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, Praeger, (New York, 1964), 43-58. 
9 Deborah M. Kolb and Eileen F. Babbitt, “Mediation Practice on the Home Front: Implications for 
Global Conflict Resolution,” Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War 
Era, John A. Vasquez, James Turner Johnson, Sanford Jaffe, and Linda Stamato eds., University of 
Michigan Press, (1996), 67. 
10 Jacob Bercovitch, “International Mediation,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 28, no. 1, Special 
Issue on International Mediation (February 1991), 3-6. 
11 Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, “Mediation in International Conflicts,” Mediation Research: 
The Process of Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention, Kenneth Kressel and Dean Pruitt eds., Jossey-
Bass, (San Francisco, 1989) 115-137.  
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ideas for a compromise and assist the adversaries in bargaining to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable compromise; however, there is no requirement for the disputants to accept the 
mediators ideas.12  
Third parties may be states, international organizations, NGOs or individuals. 
These third parties bring with them an additional set of cultural and organizational 
considerations. For the sake of simplicity, this thesis will focus on negotiations. However, 
note that the conclusions drawn from the study of international negotiations have direct 
application on international mediation attempts as well, and vice versa. 
B.  THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
Now that we have defined the terms negotiation and mediation, let us turn our 
attention to an examination of the negotiation process itself. Hopmann argues that “the 
key aspects of the negotiation process are characterized by bargaining in which 1) initial 
offers are made by each party to the other, 2) commitments are made to certain positions 
in an effort to hold firm, 3) promises of rewards and threats of sanctions are issued to 
induce other parties to make concessions, 4) concessions are made as one party moves 
closer to the other, 5) retractions of previous offers and concessions are issued as parties 
draw apart, and 6) finally, if the dynamics of concession making overcome the pressures 
to diverge, the parties tend to converge upon agreement somewhere between their 
opening offers.”13 He carefully adds that “even if agreement is reached, inequality of 
resources, of ability to exercise influence, and of bargaining skill may lead to 
asymmetrical outcomes, but in virtually all cases the outcome will constitute a 
compromise, falling somewhere between the opening positions of the parties.”14 Anatol 
Rapoport takes this process one step further by adding the importance of “developing 
                                                 
12 Saadia Touval and I. William Zartman, “Mediation in International Conflicts,” Mediation Research: 
The Process of Effectiveness of Third-Party Intervention, Kenneth Kressel and Dean Pruitt eds., Jossey-
Bass, (San Francisco, 1989) 115-137. 
13 Terrance P. Hopmann, “Bargaining and Problem Solving; Two Perspectives on International 
Negotiation,” Turbulent Peace; The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Chester A. Crocker, 




mutual understanding and seeking mutual gains that fundamental conflicts among 
different belief systems can be resolved peacefully.”15 Rapoport’s contribution here will 
have more weight when we begin to look at cross-cultural negotiations later in this thesis.  
C.  BARGAINING RANGE 
Christer Jönsson argues that “parties initially ask for more than they expect to get. 
If we add the assumption that the parties know how far they are willing to go in terms of 
concessions we can, for each party, construct a continuum ranging from its maximum 
objective to its minimum acceptable outcome or ‘resistance point’.”16 He calls this the 
contract zone or bargaining range. Jönsson admits that the difficult part is to identify the 
bargaining range accurately, which he describes as “a space where these continua overlap 
that is, where both parties prefer an agreement to breaking off negotiations.”17 He asserts 
that the “exchange of proposals” in the negotiation process “serves to gradually reveal 
whether a contract zone exists and if so, where it is located.”18 Jönsson also introduces 
the concept of BATNA (the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement). From this 
perspective, “negotiators are supposed (and recommended) to determine their resistance 
points by comparing the value of an agreement at any stage of the negotiations with the 
value of no agreement; only if a negotiated solution is better than their BATNA will (or 
should) they agree.”19 
D. TYPES OF NEGOTIATION 
Having looked at the process of negotiations we can now conduct a more detailed 
study of the different types of negotiation. Daniel Druckman points out that while there 
are some theories that can be applied to negotiations in general; there are four main 
                                                 
15 Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates, University of Michigan Press, (Ann Arbor, MI, 
1974). 
16 Christer Jönsson, “Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation,” The Handbook of International 






perspectives in the study of negotiations that provide additional considerations: 
negotiations as puzzle solving, negotiations as a bargaining game, negotiations as 
organizational management, and negotiations as diplomatic politics.20  
Druckman describes the puzzle solving method as a situation where the disputants 
“think about negotiation as a puzzle [or game] to be solved and prescribe ‘solutions’ 
based on the parties’ preferences.”21 He argues that negotiators play the game of trying to 
anticipate the next move of the other player “before making a move or decision.”22 When 
speaking of this puzzle solving method, Christer Jönsson notes that many falsely assume 
that these negotiations are symmetrical in nature.23 In his opinion, they fail to consider 
“power asymmetries” such as nuclear capability or economic superiority of one of the 
actors involved. In support of this concept, Hopmann adds that “parties with more 
attractive alternatives, and consequently with lower losses associated with the failure of 
negotiations, are more likely to be influential in claiming a larger share of the value being 
distributed within negotiations.”24  
Negotiation as a bargaining game is a situation “in which opponents exchange 
concessions” and “move gradually from their own initial positions toward the positions of 
others.”25 This falls in line with Jönsson’s concept of BATNA and Jönsson’s and 
Hoppman’s thoughts of bargaining range that we have already discussed in this chapter. 
With regard to negotiations as organizational management, Druckman writes that 
“organizational theorists view negotiation as a process of building consensus among 
                                                 
20 Daniel Druckman, “Negotiation in the International Context,” Peacemaking in International 
Conflict; Methods and Techniques, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., United States 
Institute of Peace, (Washington, D.C., 1997), 83. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Christer Jönsson, “Diplomacy, Bargaining and Negotiation,” The Handbook of International 
Relations, Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmonds eds., Sage Publications, (London, 
2002), 219. 
24 Terrence P. Hopmann, “Two Paradigms of Negotiations: Bargaining and Problem Solving,” Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (1995) vol. 542, 24-27. 
25 Daniel Druckman, “Negotiation in the International Context,” Peacemaking in International 
Conflict; Methods and Techniques, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., United States 
Institute of Peace, (Washington, D.C., 1997), 87. 
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diverse constituencies with stakes in the outcome.”26 This view of negotiation depicts it 
as a “two-tiered process” where actors must simultaneously play “the game” at the 
international negotiating table in an attempt to settle the dispute and on the domestic front 
in order to reconcile issues with its constituents and domestic political issues.27 He 
comments that this view acknowledges the true complexity of the negotiation process as 
it “recognizes the negotiator’s dilemma of being caught between the often conflicting 
expectations of his or her constituents at home and those of the negotiation’s other 
parties.”28 
Lastly, negotiation as diplomatic politics “views negotiations as another setting 
for playing the game of international politics.” This view takes a more “big picture” 
approach and is used by many “policy analysts and international relations scholars who 
are interested in how a particular negotiation fits into a broadly conceived foreign policy. 
The actors are governments whose actions are driven by policy prerogatives and 
structural elements of the international system.”29 For Druckman this view is unique in 
that the desired end state for a negotiation party might not be to resolve the issue at all, as 
parties are sometimes merely “seeking to bolster a relationship, obtain intelligence, or 
affect the actions of third parties, rather than seeking an agreement.”30 Iklé supports this 
notion of side effects of negotiations. He believes that actors might not always enter into 
negotiations as a means of coming to a resolution, but perhaps for the benefit of the side 
effects that come from merely entering into negotiations itself.31 Some of these side 
effects include: keeping open lines of communication with a opponent that is preoccupied  
 
 
                                                 
26 Daniel Druckman, “Negotiation in the International Context,” Peacemaking in International 
Conflict; Methods and Techniques, I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., United States 
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by negotiations instead of resorting to violent action;, intelligence gathering about or 
deception of the opponent; propaganda to show good will in the eyes of the world 
community; and potential impact on third parties.32  
E.  SUCCESSFUL MEDIATION 
Over the last decade, Jacob Bercovitch has developed and refined a model that 
enlists the factors commonly associated with successful mediation (see Figure 1). Many 
of the variables also apply when analyzing negotiations. His intention was to illustrate the 
main variables determining mediation success by looking at various factors surrounding 
the context, process, and outcome of mediation.33          
Figure 1.   Factors Associated with Successful Mediation34 
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Bercovitch views the nature of the parties, the nature of the dispute, and the nature 
of a mediator and the characteristics of the mediation process itself as the key 
components to pay close attention to.35 For our purpose, the nature of the parties and of 
the dispute is most relevant, Bercovitch cites the type of governmental system in place 
within each nation, the power of each of the opponents, and previous relations between 
the parties as the most important variables when analyzing the nature of the parties.36 
Although he doesn’t directly refer to it, the democratic peace hypothesis that “democratic 
nations don’t go to war with each other” is an excellent example of what Bercovich is 
talking about with reference to the governmental systems in place. David Moore also 
agrees that when the governmental system of each of the parties is similar the mediation 
process runs more smoothly.37 He states that the leaders of democratic states, “because of 
the democratic norms they have learned throughout their lives, operate within similar 
philosophic references.”38 We will discuss this concept further later in this thesis when 
analyzing political culture. The power of each of the parties can refer to any perceived 
power disparity between the opponents; this includes tangibles like military capabilities, 
but also intangibles like leadership, training, will, etc, to actually wage war.39 When 
examining the nature of the dispute, Bercovitch contends that duration and timing of the 
intervention, fatalities suffered and intensity of the conflict at the time of intervention, as 
well as the issues being disputed are the most important variables.40 
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More than Bercovitch, Gilady and Russet acknowledge the role of political 
culture as part of the conflict resolution process. They agree with Bercovitch’s contention 
that power disparity and ability to wage war play a major role in reference to the nature 
of the parties. They also agree with Moore’s the democratic peace thesis that “democratic 
nations don’t go to war with each other.”41 They cite that “democratic government entails 
both cultural practices of non-violence and institutions to facilitate the peaceful 
settlement of conflicts of interest, in external relations as well as domestic politics.”42 We 
will explore the ideas regarding political culture of all of these scholars later in this 
chapter. 
F. WHERE DOES CULTURE COME INTO PLAY? 
Bercovitch mentions culture when he considers the political and cultural system 
of the conflicting parties.43 However, his model is quite limited when it comes to the 
analysis of the “nature of the dispute.” Bercovitch makes only casual mention of cultural 
considerations in his model.44 Many enduring conflicts are rooted in culturally engrained 
prejudices and biases against “the other.” Bercovitch makes no specific mention of 
culture in his discussion of these variables other than acknowledging that parties of 
similar cultures have less conflict.45 Overall, his theory does not adequately include 
cultural considerations. Moore, Gilady and Russett acknowledge the significance of 
political culture, but remain rather general in their treatment of culture in the conflict 
resolution process. 
I argue that these approaches are all insufficient to grasp the impact of culture on 
international negotiation. They reflect a general tendency in the literature to neglect this 
variable in the mediation process. First, all the actors involved in a negotiation process 
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bring their cultural background to the negotiation table. They are culture-bearing units – 
the disputing parties as well as the mediator. Thus, if a third-party mediator is engaged in 
the conduct of negotiations, his or her culture and negotiating style also has to be taken 
into account. But culture figures in even more prominently. Actually, it penetrates all the 
variables these scholars discuss. For example, the relationship between the parties is 
strongly influenced by the mutual images of their cultures, which stimulate affinity or 
distance, up to ethnic stereotyping. The previous relationship between the parties is also 
strongly determined by perceptions of cultural affinity. Thus, culture should be 
considered as a constant intervening variable in the conflict resolution process. However, 
as previously mentioned, in order to reduce complexity of the issues addressed within this 
thesis, I will be leaving out mediators and their cultures and concentrate on the 
conflicting parties and how culture shapes their negotiation behavior and the dispute 
history overall. 
G. FACTORS THAT HINDER SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS 
While we have noted all of the factors that contribute to successful negotiations, 
let us also consider factors that may hinder or render negotiations unsuccessful. Marieke 
Kleiboer asserts that willingness to negotiate is a minimal requirement for a settlement or 
a resolution to come about.46 Demonstrated hesitation to work toward a solution on the 
part of either actor can cause a complete breakdown of negotiations. In their book War 
and Peace in International Rivalry, Paul Diehl, Gary Goertz, and John Vasquez note that 
nations involved in enduring conflict are more likely to resort to violence and go to war. 
Furthermore, they note that once engaged in conflict, the longer the dispute, the more 
violent the battle becomes.47 This is significant because lack of cultural awareness can 
draw out negotiation over a longer time period, thereby increasing chances of increased 
violence.  
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H.  THE NEGOTIATION “GAME” 
The negotiation “game” is played out at several bargaining tables. Jönnsson 
asserts “that every bilateral international negotiation encompasses at least three 
bargaining processes: the external one between the two parties, and two internal ones 
within each of the parties.”48 Thus, negotiations can be “represented as one main game 
with a number of sub-games or ‘auxiliary games’ the playing of which influences the 
playing and outcome of the main game.”49 Using Jönsson’s concept of negotiations, with 
the added insight of cultural considerations, it is easy to see the complexity of the 
negotiation and mediation process. Culture comes into play at both levels of the “game.” 
At an individual level, each party is guided by cultural norms which shape their 
perception of the nature of the conflict (e.g., of the issues concerned and their rank 
ordering), of the nature of the other party (e.g., in terms of cultural affinity or hierarchy) 
and of the process of how to conduct negotiations. In order to achieve consensus on a 
course of action on the domestic level, each party has also to deal with internal 
controversy which may be stimulated by different cultural norms clashing before they can 
even approach the negotiating table for the “main game” with another party. Once they 
come to the negotiating table for the “main game,” each party may once again be faced 
with a foreign culture who’s norms are unfamiliar thereby causing strains in negotiation 
attempts. These levels might be decomposed for analytical purposes, but we have to keep 
in mind that the levels constantly interact as the negotiation process evolves. 
Overall, conflict resolution research has mostly ignored cultural perspectives of 
individual nations involved in a conflict as a factor to consider during negotiations. We 
will now turn our attention toward an examination of culture, based on what is written so 
far on civil, political and strategic culture. 
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III.  CIVIC, POLITICAL, AND STRATEGIC CULTURE 
In order to understand the role of culture in the negotiation process, we must first 
understand what the term “culture” really means. Existing cultural theories divide the 
concept of “culture” into organizational, political, strategic, and global. If we conduct a 
search of the word “culture” in academic databases, we also find this term grouped into 
three distinct areas. These areas are grouped much like the Russian Matryoshka dolls 
where one small doll fits inside the next larger and so on. The smallest doll, civic culture, 
fits neatly inside of political culture, which is entirely consumed by the largest doll, 
strategic culture. Let us begin by examining existing cultural theories. 
A. DOES CULTURE MATTER? 
Bercovitch and Elgström explain that proponents of culture in conflict 
management base their perspective “on communication theory and on general works on 
the nature and influence of national culture.”50 They explain that advocates of cultural 
theories believe that culture impacts negotiations and mediation in order to explain “the 
logical chains between culture and behavior.”51 They make specific mention that “most 
common is the assertion that cultural dissonance leads to misperceptions that may result 
in negotiation failure.”52 They are also careful to note that “culture can also influence 
negotiations regardless of misunderstandings: it affects the positions as well as the 
strategies of the conflict parties.”53  
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Faure and Sjöstedt expound on Bercovich and Elgström’s discussion of cultural 
theory by explaining that “culture may determine the whole outlook on negotiations.”54 
They note that “cultural background conditions how the actor perceives issues, other 
actors, and their intentions.55  
Stephen Weiss also places importance on the impact of cultural perceptions on the 
negotiation process. He lists “the actors’ basic conception of negotiation, their orientation 
toward time, their willingness to take risks, their protocol, and their decision-making 
style” as the distinctive cultural characteristics that affect negotiations.56 Glen Fisher 
argues that conflicting beliefs, morals and methods of communication, all rooted in 
culture, influence negotiations in various ways.57 Some of these include; shaping the 
individual’s perception of the situation, assigning meaning onto the other party’s actions, 
and leading the individual to inaccurately interpret the motivations of the other.58  
On the other hand, some theorists are unimpressed with the argument that culture 
of any sort plays a crucial role in conflict management. In their discussion of the 
arguments against the impact of culture as an aspect of conflict resolution, Berchovitch 
and Elgström note that detractors of cultural theories typically argue one of four main 
points. Some site “national interests are the main determinants of international 
negotiations.”59 Others stress “the impact of power” as the key factor that supersedes all 
others.60 They go on to explain that these skeptics also tend to view conflict management 
and mediation as “a universal process” and that culture merely influences the manner in 
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which that process is executed.61 Lastly, critics of cultural theories typically believe in 
the concept of “a universal diplomatic culture.”62 They believe that it is this common 
diplomatic culture that in turn minimizes the influence of individual national cultures.63 
Since all of these diplomats understand the common “universal diplomatic culture,” 
“culturally based misunderstandings play little role in conflict management.”64 
Michael Desch is highly critical of culture as a key to conflict management. The 
basic difficulty of even defining the term ‘culture’ makes it a difficult concept to 
operationalize. He goes on to say that “definitions such as ‘collectively held ideas, 
beliefs, and norms that cultural theorists commonly use are so broad and imprecise that 
they have proven difficult to operationalize.”65 Desch also argues that cultural theories 
fall short because they tend to analyze single cases as opposed to looking at trends over a 
number of representative conflicts. Lastly, Desch argues “culturalism is a research 
program rather than a concrete theory.”66  
These arguments are valid, yet not fully convincing. Culture is a crucial part of 
the conflict management process. Misunderstandings between negotiating parties rooted 
in cultural awareness and understanding indeed often create breakdowns in 
communication that contribute to negotiation failure. Culture plays a role in the 
negotiation process from the start when the parties approach the negotiation table with 
culturally based morals and values that frame their perception of the problem itself and 
their counterpart. Culture continues to play a role in the negotiation process as the 
individual negotiators go through the negotiating proceedings as culture shapes the way 
they interact with the other party, their decision making process and their perception of 
the progress being made. Culture also preconditions the outcome of the negotiation 
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process as it shapes what compromises may or may not be made, how the outcome will 
be implemented, and how it will be presented in its final form. With this understanding of 
existing cultural theories, let us now turn to the different dimensions of culture we find in 
academia. 
B. DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE 
As already mentioned, cultural theories typically fall into one of four categories: 
organizational, political, strategic, and global.67 Jeffrey Legro expounds on the idea of 
organizational culture by arguing that a nation’s preference to participate, or not, in 
international cooperation is primarily derived from that nation’s “domestic social and 
bureaucratic influence, namely organizational culture, not the balance of power.”68 If this 
approach is correct, then the nation’s military establishment and its organizational culture 
also shape its diplomacy. Furthermore, Elizabeth Kier makes an argument for difference 
in a nations approach to conflict resolution based on its own domestic political culture. 
She notes that military doctrine is formulated primarily by civilian policy makers. 
Therefore, if a nation is, as a whole, more conservative, then that attitude will also be 
reflected in its foreign policy.69 Similarly, Peter Katzenstein believes in the notion of the 
“cultural-institutional context of policy” as a determinant of national security policy.70 
Lastly, Martha Finnemore argues that global cultural trends are the driving factors that 
shape international cooperation.71 She believes that as states increasingly participate and 
socialize in international organizations, which act thus as forums diffusing cultural 
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norms, states conform to more globally acceptable courses of action.72 Thus, an 
individual nations’ diplomacy is shaped by the ebbs and flows of international pressures 
stemming from their participation in various international organizations. Let us now 
examine another perspective. This viewpoint breaks culture into various levels, starting 
with the common theme at all levels and the smallest of our cultural Matryoshka doll 
analogy, civic culture. 
C. CIVIC CULTURE 
For the purposes of this thesis we will equate the commonly used term “culture” 
with civic culture. Anyone who has traveled abroad has experienced the phenomenon 
known as “culture shock.” This is the experience of being confronted with customs and 
attitudes different from your own. Harry Eckstein argues that, “Culture is the distinctive, 
variable set of ways in which societies normatively regulate social behavior.”73  
Many sociologists and anthropologists have attempted to define the concept of 
culture. Most of these definitions start from a set of common customs, norms, and 
manners. For example, Raymond Cohen defines culture as the “remarkable variety of 
customs, manners, and forms of social organization developed by the human race in the 
conduct of its everyday affairs.”74 Cohen’s definition also includes belief systems and 
artifacts as part of culture. He notes that culture is “an expression of the cumulative 
values of a particular community, as well as their traditional societal interactions and 
artifacts, and a means of interaction with others.”75 E.B. Taylor defines culture as “that 
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”76 Johnston is careful to 
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add that in the case where a particular society is comprised of more than one sub-culture, 
“there is a generally dominant culture.”77 That is to say that the society mainly takes on 
characteristics of the dominant culture. 
These descriptions of the various components of civic culture are by no means 
exhaustive as I believe culture is more of a concept than a tangible, definable entity. For 
the purposes of this thesis, we will consider the following conglomeration of all of the 
above definitions as our definition of civic culture. Civic culture is the distinctive, 
variable set of ways in which societies regulate social behavior through a remarkably 
complex variety of customs, manners, and forms of social organization to include 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, artifacts and habits acquired by man as a 
member of a particular group. Let us now build around the civic culture Matryoshka doll 
to reveal more about the next doll we are now able to construct, political culture. 
D. POLITICAL CULTURE 
The concept of culture permeates every aspect of a society, including its domestic 
and international political spheres. Political scientists have weighed in on the concept of 
political culture. That implies that due to cultural aspects of a particular society a given 
political entity or government will act in a certain way. Gabriel Almond and Sidney 
Verba defined political culture as “consisting of cognitive, affective and evaluative 
orientations to political phenomena distributed in national populations or in subgroups.”78 
They elaborate on this idea by stating that “a political culture orients a people toward a 
polity and its processes, providing it with a system of beliefs (a cognitive map), a way of 
evaluating its operations, and a set of expressive symbols.”79 Components of a nations’ 
political culture are “the sense of national identity, attitudes toward oneself as participant,  
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attitudes toward one’s fellow citizens, attitudes and expectations regarding governmental 
output and performance, and knowledge about and attitudes toward the political 
processes of decision making.”80 
Some scholars acknowledge the role of civic culture in political culture. Lucien 
Pye writes that “the tactics and strategies people employ in politics are essentially the 
playing out of the defense mechanisms basic to the personalities of the individuals 
involved.”81 That is to say that the perceptions and attitudes within their civic culture are 
manifested in the political actions of the individual actors involved. Pye adds, “Who is 
the enemy? Who is a friend? When to attack? When to retreat? What are the relationship 
of ends and means? Such questions, and a host of similar ones, make up the basic 
operational code of any political actor, and how they are answered is always a function of 
personality.” 82 Alastair Johnston adds that “multiple cultures can exist within one social 
entity (community, organization, state, etc.), but there is a generally dominant culture.”83 
This is the culture that manifests itself in a nation’s political culture.84 
As we have already discovered in the negotiation and mediation portion of this 
thesis, many scholars refer only to political culture as playing a role in conflict resolution. 
Specifically, they agree with the democratic peace argument that “democratic nations 
don’t go to war with each other” due to a common set of “cultural practices of non-
violence and institutions to facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts” 85 Joffe believes 
that democracies tend “to view the world as an extension of their domestic polities.”86 
                                                 
80 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Revisited, Sage Publications Inc., (Newbury 
Park, CA, 1989) 26-27. 
81 Lucian Pye, “Political Culture Revisited,” Political Psychology, vol. 12, no. 3, (September 1991), 
501.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Alastair I. Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security, vol. 19, no. 4, 
(Spring 1995), 45. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Lilach Gilady and Bruce Russett, “Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution,” Handbook of 
International Relations, SAGE Publications Ltd., (2002), 392-397. 
86 Josef Joffe, “Tocqueville revisited: Are good democracies bad players in the game of nations?,” The 
New Democracies: Global change and U.S. Policy, Brad Roberts ed., MIT Press, (Cambridge, MA, 1990), 
125. 
 24
Raymond expounds on this by saying that “the procedural norms that govern conflict 
resolution in daily life are externalized. What functions at home is assumed to be viable 
abroad.”87 If we refer back to the brief example at the beginning of this thesis, it is easy 
to see how an actors civic culture directly impacts the interactions of that nations political 
culture as well. The Chinese civic culture says that asking the other to wait and sharing a 
meal before negotiations is acceptable while American civic culture stresses “business 
before pleasure” and punctuality. With our political culture Matryoshka doll fully in tact, 
we can now begin to piece together the largest of our cultural Matryoshka dolls, strategic 
culture. 
E. STRATEGIC CULTURE 
There are many definitions of strategic culture floating around in academia. Daryl 
Howlett defines the concept of strategic culture by stating that “strategic culture is a 
product of a range of circumstances such as geography, history and narratives that shape 
collective identity, but one which also allows it a role in both enabling and constraining 
decisions about security.”88 Snyder looks at strategic culture a little differently. He 
defines strategic culture as “a set of semi-permanent elite beliefs, attitudes, and behavior 
patterns socialized into a distinctive mode of thought.”89 Rosen takes yet another 
approach by describing strategic culture as “beliefs and assumptions that frame...choices 
about international military behavior, particularly those concerning decisions to go to 
war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare, and levels of 
wartime casualties that would be acceptable.”90 Lastly, Johnston writes that strategic 
culture consists of “shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order 
on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or 
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political environment.”91 These definitions of strategic culture demonstrate that this 
concept is “all encompassing” in that it combines the notions of civic and political culture 
and puts them in a framework of how nations conduct decision making based on their 
cultural background. 
Alastair Johnston aptly illustrates the concept of strategic culture with an analogy 
taken from the U.S.-Soviet Cold War relations. He writes “the former Soviet military was 
said to exhibit a preference for preemptive, offensive uses of force that was deeply rooted 
in Russia's history of external expansionism and internal autocracy.”92 He goes on to 
explain that “the United States, on the other hand, tended to exhibit a tendency towards a 
sporadic, messianic and crusading use of force that was deeply rooted in the moralism of 
the early republic and in a fundamental belief that warfare was an aberration in human 
relations.'“93 These “characterizations of the superpowers' strategic predispositions” are 
exactly what we are talking about when we refer to a nation’s strategic culture.94 
Howlett very concisely describes how strategic culture plays out on the 
international stage when he asserts,  
three distinct areas where strategic culture can contribute to policymaking 
are: in the analysis of threats; in considering the cultural context where 
conflict is underway; and in negotiations aimed at inducing peaceful 
relations. Each of these areas will have a range of complex factors 
associated with it but there is likely to be an underlying strategic cultural 
dimension that also should be incorporated. In the analysis of threats, for 
example, strategic culture can supplement traditional approaches by 
allowing the potential for anticipating, although not necessarily predicting, 
changes in the security environment. Such threats may be global in context 
but act locally in culturally derived ways. A strategic cultural analysis can 
therefore assist in considering how to respond to developments like these 
by exploring different pathways by which this type of threat emerges and 
devise a range of intervention strategies to suit the particular circumstance. 
Analyses of this kind may require considerable knowledge of any given  
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actor and it will not be an exact science, but it can contribute to a long-
term understanding of the factors that shape strategic culture identities in a 
globalizing world.95 
F. THE CULTURAL MATRYOSHKA DOLL 
Our cultural Matryoshka doll is now fully constructed. We can clearly see how 
civic culture neatly fits into political culture, which further easily nestles itself into 
strategic culture. Just like our cultural Matryoshka doll, analyses of culture at any of these 
individual levels, just as the individual dolls themselves, would be empty. Civic culture is 
the core. It is from the core of civic culture that the individual political actors get their set 
of customs, manners, and forms of social organization on how to conduct themselves in 
their day to day relations with others. All of their knowledge, beliefs, morals, customs, 
habits, and adherence to laws play into their interactions both domestically with other 
politicians, as well as internationally when representing their nation on the world stage, 
especially at the negotiating table. It is here that the political culture of the nation, an 
expression of civic culture in the political realm, feeds into that nation’s strategic culture 
in determining how it will perceive and interact with other nations in security affairs. 
Our analysis of civic culture, political culture, and strategic culture has given us a 
clear understanding of these levels and how they interrelate. We have also examined 
negotiation and mediation in an attempt to understand the conflict resolution process. Let 
us now turn our attention toward merging these two fields by looking at cross-cultural 
negotiation. 
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IV. CROSS-CULTURAL NEGOTIATION 
A. CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION 
A significant amount of literature covers the exploration of culture and cross-
cultural communication. As we have seen in the previous portion of this chapter, 
throughout the literature on culture, we find that many sociologists and anthropologists 
have attempted to define the concept of culture. One thing they all agree on is that this is 
a difficult concept to define concisely. To review, for the purposes of thesis, we have 
defined culture as the distinctive, variable set of ways in which societies regulate social 
behavior through a remarkably complex variety of customs, manners, and forms of social 
organization, to include knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs, artifacts and habits 
acquired by man as a member of a particular group. Now let us take this concept of 
culture and examine how it affects communication between cultures.  
Typically cultural research includes in-depth studies of a specific culture, its 
components and how that particular society interacts with others. A trip to the travel 
section of your local bookstore will give you basic studies done on just about every 
culture on earth! For more in-depth cultural analysis, however, you’ll have to head to the 
sociology or anthropology sections of a library. These works include detailed descriptions 
of each culture but also include analyses of how those cultures function on a day-to-day 
basis. Researchers are beginning to expand that research to include communication with 
other cultures as an aspect of cultural research. However, to date, most of this type of 
research has been applied to the mediation and negotiation processes in business. 
Scholars are only beginning to delve into culture as a factor of the mediation and 
negotiation processes in diplomatic interaction. 
John L. Graham wrote that “communication theory suggests that when two people 
are effectively sharing ideas, their communication behaviors – both verbal and nonverbal 
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– will be rhythmically coordinated.”96 His research analyzed the verbal interactions as 
well as nonverbal communication such as the number of silent periods in a typical 
business negotiation, conversational overlaps, facial gazing, and touching during the 
conduct of Japanese, American, and Brazilian business negotiating practices. From these 
observations, Graham concluded that “substantial differences in bargaining style exist 
across cultures.”97 For example, he found that Americans use aggressive persuasion 
tactics.98 Japanese negotiators were more likely to ask for higher profit margins while 
American negotiators were more likely to offer “fair price.” Furthermore, he notes that in 
the business world, “cultural differences in bargaining processes… are potential sources 
for friction and misunderstandings between bargainers and increased transaction costs for 
international commercial relationships.”99 Since these cultural differences have been 
noted to have a serious impact on business negotiations, one can infer the profound 
impact of these same types of discrepancies on international mediation proceedings. 
If we step outside the business world for a moment, we will find that several 
authors address the fundamental differences in perception of a given situation as being 
the root of disputes and possible disconnect when conducting communications with those 
from another culture. Richard Nisbett explains that the disparity between the perceptions 
of the two cultures has a profound effect on the actions of actors from each of these 
cultures in modern society.100 He notes that East Asian thought is more “holistic” while 
Westerners rely more on rules and logic to guide their actions.  
Raymond Cohen writes that this difference of perception directly affects how 
nations approach negotiations with nations from one of two distinct styles. “Low context” 
nations, he writes, such as the United States and Europeans, have a highly “verbal and 
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explicit style typical of individualistic societies.”101 Jennifer Beer goes into further detail 
on the attributes of a low context cultures. She writes that they are typically: 
• “Rule oriented, people play by external rules  
• More knowledge is codified, public, external, and accessible.  
• Sequencing, separation--of time, of space, of activities, of relationships  
• More interpersonal connections of shorter duration  
• Knowledge is more often transferable  
• Task-centered. Decisions and activities focus around what needs to be 
done, division of responsibilities.”102 
Cohen explains that Asian nations, such as China, are considered to be “high 
context” nations, and therefore prefer “a style associated with nonverbal and implicit 
communication.”103 Beer explains that high context cultures are typically:  
• “Less verbally explicit communication, less written/formal information  
• More internalized understandings of what is communicated  
• Multiple cross-cutting ties and intersections with others  
• Long term relationships  
• Strong boundaries- who is accepted as belonging vs who is considered an 
“outsider”  
• Knowledge is situational, relational  
• Decisions and activities focus around personal face-to-face relationships, 
often around a central person who has authority.”104 
Beer goes on to depict the impact of these different communication styles by 
explaining the difficulties one might face when entering into the realm of the other. She 
                                                 
101 Raymond Cohen, Negotiating across Culture: International Communication in an Interdependent 
World, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1991, 216. 
102 Jennifer Beer, “High and Low Context Definitions,” Communicating across Cultures, 2003, 
http://www.culture-at-work.com/highlow.html#Definitions (accessed 13 March 2008). 
103 Cohen, Raymond, Negotiating Across Culture: International Communication in an Interdependent 
World, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1991, 216. 
104 Jennifer Beer, “High and Low Context Definitions,” Communicating across Cultures, 2003, 
http://www.culture-at-work.com/highlow.html#Definitions (accessed 13 March 2008).  
 30
writes “high contexts can be difficult to enter if you are an outsider.”105 She attributes 
this to the fact that an actor entering into the realm of high context doesn’t “carry the 
context information internally” and “can't instantly create close relationships.”106 On the 
other hand, Beer explains that “low contexts are relatively easy to enter if you are an 
outsider.”107 She attributes this to the following factors: “because the environment 
contains much of the information you need to participate, because you can form 
relationships fairly soon, and because the important thing is accomplishing a task rather 
than feeling your way into a relationship.”108 Again, we see distinct differences in basic 
communication style, let alone negotiation style.  
Lastly, Robert Jervis describes how culture gets drawn into the decision making 
process by individual representatives of a nation at the mediation table. He explains that 
in order for good decisions to be made at the negotiating table, it is crucial for the 
individual representative to “predict how others will behave.”109 In this situation, in order 
to influence their behavior, he must “estimate how they will react to the alternative 
policies he can adopt.”110 Jervis contends that “even if his actions do not affect theirs, he 
needs to know how they will act in order to tailor his actions accordingly.”111 Therefore, 
Jervis contends that if the individual representative does not feel they have adequate 
information about the other state’s “general attributes” (i.e., “developed or 
underdeveloped, democratic or dictatorial, stable or unstable”), the individual negotiator 
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beliefs, and goals could explain the state’s behavior. He will then use the results of this 
analysis, together with estimates of the external stimuli the state is likely to face, to 
predict how it will behave in the future.”112 
Jervis’ description makes multiple references to the need to deduce or predict 
actions of the other based on existing beliefs held by the negotiator. From our studies thus 
far, we now recognize that this means that the beliefs and norms of a negotiator, rooted in 
civic culture, frame the way he perceives a conflict and the other disputant, which in turn 
shapes his decisions on a course of action and thus his negotiating behavior. One element 
of this belief system pertains to images of the other disputant’s culture, relative to his 
own. These underlying cultural conditions are, inter alia, reflected in communication 
styles, high context or low context, at the negotiating table. These differences are only 
further magnified in an international mediation process setting, once a third party with its 
own predispositions enters the framework. With this foundational understanding of cross-
cultural communication in mind, let us now delve into the concept of cultural match and 
mismatch. 
B. CULTURAL MATCH AND MISMATCH 
In international negotiations, often two parties of different cultural background 
interact. A prerequisite for understanding the impact of culture on process and outcome is 
to measure the degree of cultural match or mismatch among them. As we have noted thus 
far, an actor’s culture predisposes his or her political behavior. This culturally shaped 
guideline for individual and collective behavior is often referred to as a norm. Martha 
Finnemore defines a norm as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given 
identity.”113 Cultural match exists when two actors agree on basic norms of appropriate  
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behavior. Alternatively, cultural mismatch occurs when the parties have divergent 
cultural norms. Match and mismatch, of course, have to be understood as poles of a 
continuum, thus in grades.  
Andrew Cortell and James W. Davis have looked at the domestic impact of 
internationally accepted norms. They argue “when such a cultural match exists, domestic 
actors are likely to treat the international norm as a given, instinctively recognizing the 
obligations associated with the norm.”114 Cortell and Davis note that resistance to the 
norms of “the other,” in case of mismatch, may occur because they are perceived as 
“cultural imperialism or colonialism” and therefore “cause domestic resistance or 
rejection.”115 Cortell and Davis contend that this is, in fact, the case in parts of Asia. 
“Certain Asian governments and elites reject calls for policies reflecting Western 
conceptions of human rights and political pluralism as they feel this runs counter to their 
notion of ‘Asian values’.”116  
C. COMPONENTS OF CULTURE AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES 
Determining individual and measurable indicators within a culture in order to 
assess cultural match or mismatch seems like an overwhelming task. There are so many 
aspects to consider! Luckily several scholars have tackled this subject for us. In the early 
1980’s, Hofstede conducted extensive surveys of IBM employees. His conclusions reveal 
that a nation’s civic culture encompasses five dimensions: 1) individualism v. 
collectivism, 2) power and inequality, 3) uncertainty avoidance, 4) masculinity v. 
femininity, and 5) long term v. short term orientation.117 These five dimensions are 
depicted in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2.   Hofestede’s Components of a Nation’s Civic Culture 
From their study of international conflict management, Bercovitch and Elgström 
identified the following five variables as “offering the most promise in assessing cultural 
uniformity or diversity,” which corresponds to our preferred terminology of match and 
mismatch: 1) geographical proximity, 2) type of political system, 3) level of political 
rights, 4) level of civil liberties, and 5) religion.118 Each of these is depicted in Figure 3. 
Embedded within each of these categories, they were further able to identify “seven 
distinct geographical regions, nine different political systems, and eighteen types of 
single or joint religions.”119 They also analyzed and rated both political rights and civil 
liberties on a sliding scale ranging from “complete freedom” to “no freedom.”120 
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Figure 3.   Berchovitch and Elgström’s Components to Assess Cultural Uniformity or 
Diversity 
While the arguments of Berchovitch and Elgström on many of their points are 
helpful for this thesis, I do synthesize their findings with the other conceptualizations, 
including insights from cross-cultural communication. Surely, all of the variables 
Bercovitch, Elgström and Hofstede devised come into play at some point. However, for 
the sake of parsimony and clarity, I have narrowed the field to the cultural variables that 
most influence negotiations. Therefore, this thesis does not include Bercovitch and 
Elgström’s variables of level of political rights, level of civil liberties, or religion. The 
first two are very close and therefore difficult to separate. Confining the analysis to type 
of political system adequately addresses these dimensions as certain political systems 
directly lend themselves to corresponding levels of rights and liberties. I do not include 
religion as many cultures are comprised of morals and values emanating from a plurality 
of religions represented as subgroups within that society. While one religion may, in fact, 
be part of the dominant culture, the other variables will adequately depict the same  
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results. This thesis also does not consider Hofestede’s variables of uncertainty avoidance 
or masculinity vs. femininity. Both of these variables are too ambiguous and difficult to 
measure for the purposes of our discussion. 
Based on these considerations, we can now develop our own indicators of cultural 
match or mismatch. For the purposes of this thesis, we will rely on the following six 
variables, formulated as dichotomies, to assess cultural match or mismatch; they build on 
Hofestede, Berchovitch and Elgström’s, but also include insights from cross-cultural 
communication:  
• high context vs. low context,  
• individualism vs. collectivism,  
• Perceptions of superiority vs. inferiority,  
• long term vs. short term orientation, 
• geographical proximity vs. distance, and  
• democratic vs. authoritarian.  
These variables are depicted in Figure 4. It is assumed that each of these 
perceptions can influence the bargaining range of one or both sides. High context refers 
to a nonverbal and implicit communication style, while low context refers to a much 
more verbal and explicit style typical of individualistic societies. Individualist thinking 
takes the individual as the central reference object, collectivist thinking the collectivity, 
here the nation or state. Perceptions of superiority versus inferiority refer to each actors’ 
perception of who holds more power in the negotiation scenario and any feelings of 
inequality that may result from that perception. Long term orientation vs. short term 
orientation refers to judgments on timing: how long a negotiation process and the 
implementation of outcomes should take. If a culture believes in “getting right down to 
the heart of the matter” and negotiators from such a culture are confronted with a culture 
that holds the belief that “these things take time,” negotiations may be quite tense. 
Geographic proximity refers to the spatial distance between the countries negotiating. 
Distance itself is no cultural phenomenon, yet it often indicates the amount of cultural 
affinity and thus the capacity to work with the other. Parties living in one region have 
experienced intense interaction over time, drawing their cultures close together; parties 
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living far apart often do not have this kind of exchange and cultural spill-over and thus 
are more culturally separated. Proximity thus helps assessing the similarity of cultural 
norms. Finally, democratic vs. authoritarian refers to the type of political system or 
regime type. The assumption is that similar regime type signals affinity, different regime 
type distance. 
Following Bercovitch and Elgström, I hypothesize that foundational differences, 
deeply rooted in civic culture, between disputants in any of these areas “reduce the 
likelihood of a successful mediation outcome; and conversely similarities between 
countries increase the chances of a successful outcome.”121 I expect that the likelihood of 
mediation failure increases with the amount of mismatching variables and the intensity of 
mismatch. However, I do not in this thesis get into the relative weight of these cultural 























Figure 4.   Components to Assess Cultural Match or Mismatch 
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D. LINKING CULTURE AND MEDIATION SUCCESS 
Bercovitch and Elgström took on the challenge of addressing the concept of 
cultural match in relation to mediation success. They studied 295 international conflicts, 
of which 171 were submitted to mediation attempts. Conflicts were mediated ranging 
from once to several times. To simplify matters, they based “mediation success” on “the 
behavioral consequences of mediation only.”122 Therefore, they deemed the mediation to 
be successful “when it had made a considerable difference to the parties observed.”123 
Conversely, mediation was determined to be unsuccessful “when it has no effect 
whatsoever on the parties’ level of conflict.”124 Their initial hypothesis was confirmed by 
careful analysis of the resulting data. They concluded that cultural match or mismatch 
does in fact influence mediation success or failure. They asserted that “countries, just like 
individuals, bring their cognitive structures, values and beliefs to conflict 
management.”125 They noted that these attributes are all rooted in civic culture.126 Lastly, 
they hypothesized that “countries with similar cognitive structures and shared values” 
(i.e., similar civic culture) will address conflict management measures, such as mediation, 
in a similar fashion.127 As Berchovitch and Elgström point out, the problem is to define 
“the components and characteristics” of culture so that we may determine if cultural 
match or mismatch exists.128 Based on their findings, Bercovitch and Elgström devised 
the model shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5.   A Model of Cultural Similarity and Mediation Success129 
If we now take Bercovitch’s and Elgström’s lead and apply our own concept of 
the components to assess cultural match or mismatch that we have devised, we can create 
our own model indicating how cultural match or mismatch might lead us to deduce the 
probability of successful mediation attempts. I acknowledge that this method presupposes 
that each of these variables is of equal relevance. In reality there are too many other 
variables beyond culture that also figure in (see Bercovitch’s contingency model). 
Isolating the culture variable is a task which necessitates a far more complex research 
design. Mediator profile, international system, and nature of conflict are but a few of the 
numerous other variables that are at work. However, it is my contention that cultural 
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mismatch is one major cause for mediation failure which can be observed ‘at work’, even 
if causality cannot be stringently established. Cultural match thus increases the relative 
likelihood of success in mediation, without of course guaranteeing it. Figure 6 is a 
diagram that plugs in these variables. Based on the number of matches the two cultures 



















































Figure 6.   The Probability of Successful Mediation Based on Cultural Match or 
Mismatch 
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Evidence from the literature we have already discussed strongly supports our 
newly formed graphic. Bercovitch and Elgström’s research also confirmed “a very strong 
relationship between cultural differences and mediation outcomes.”130 In fact, they 
briefly surmise their research by saying that “cultural differences between parties lead to 
fewer successful cases of conflict management.”131  
Based on the above information, diagrams, and conclusions, I contend that this 
concept of cultural match and mismatch can in fact be transferred to international 
negotiations among parties harboring specific cultures of varying overlap. The existence, 
or non-existence, of cultural match influences the likelihood of a successful outcome of 
negotiations. Let us now take this concept of cultural match and mismatch and apply it in 
two case studies. 
                                                 
130 Jacob Bercovitch and Ole Elgström, “Culture and International Mediation: Exploring Theoretical 
and Empirical Linkages,” International Negotiation, 2001, vol. 6, 19. 
131 Ibid. 
 41
V. U.S./PRC CULTURAL MATCH OR MISMATCH? 
When attempting to assess a nation’s negotiation behavior, one must often make 
generalizations of that culture, trying to condense ideal types which still allow for 
significant variance among actors. Negotiators both reflect the civic culture they are 
socialized in but also are individuals with their own tastes, character, style etc. They are 
not a complete reflection of ‘their’ culture. Yet, in the following paragraphs we will 
discuss and analyze negotiation behavior derived from various cultures. Although 
individual actors might diverge from this pattern and although individual overlap might 
be stronger than an ideal type delineation might make us assume, for the purposes of 
examining and comparing negotiating styles the best way is to compare and contrast 
these ideal types first.  
A. CHINESE CULTURE IN NEGOTIATIONS 
Much of the literature on Chinese negotiation style notes that in general, the 
Chinese have much trepidation when entering into negotiations of any kind, especially 
those concerning relations with the United States. They view negotiations with the U.S. 
as “one form of struggle against imperialism.”132 With this in mind, it is easy to 
understand why the Chinese take formal negotiations so seriously.  
Lucian Pye notes, “The Chinese are skilled at using their role as hosts to control 
the timing of meetings, the arrangement of agendas, and the general pacing of 
negotiations.”133 American counterparts might get frustrated with the seemingly relaxed 
and organized nature of the agenda. However, Pye carefully states that to the Chinese, 
“displaying impatience is a major sin, and they are masters of the art of stalling while 
keeping alive the other party’s hopes.”134 Furthermore, despite the fact that American 
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negotiators must jump through extensive “hoops” such as arranging for visas and setting 
up formal liaisons in order to even meet with their Chinese counterparts, the Chinese 
view negotiations as a “favor seeking” venture by the foreign negotiator.135 Pye also 
notes that the Chinese attach great importance to accuracy, and will often ignore the tone 
of a meeting and “single-mindedly press for clarification, often in a persistent if not rude 
fashion”136 If these factors weren’t already frustrating enough for visiting foreign 
negotiators, “Chinese negotiating teams tend to be large, but lines of authority can be 
diffuse and vague.”137 Those sitting at the table are often not always the final decision 
makers and therefore may promise more than what their superiors would be willing to 
accept. Let us now look at the Chinese perception of negotiations and how that might 
influence Sino-American negotiations. 
Alfred Wilhelm writes that when utilizing negotiations as a tactic, the Chinese 
rarely make concessions at the expense of sacrificing principles they deem “essential to 
the accomplishment of long-term or strategic objectives.”138 He further notes that 
Chinese tend to view negotiations more as a means of “reducing opposition to their 
viewpoint” rather than a means to come to a resolution of a dispute.139 This tactic of not 
making concessions and viewing the objective of negotiations as bringing “the other” to 
understand their viewpoint plays into their overall Sino-American relations strategy. This 
has profound impact on the Chinese interactions with major world powers as China seeks 
to gain more influence and power in the region and on the world stage. We will later 
assess the ramifications of these attitudes and mannerisms when we assess the likelihood  
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of successful negotiations between the U.S. and China based on their cultural match or 
mismatch. However, to make this assessment, we must first understand and assess 
American culture. 
B. AMERICAN CULTURE IN NEGOTIATIONS 
American culture has a notorious reputation when it comes to negotiations. A 
Special Report from the U.S. Institute of Peace found that “U.S. negotiators have a 
distinctive style: forceful, explicit, legalistic, urgent, and results-oriented.”140 
Furthermore, they note that “while American diplomats tend to see themselves as tough 
but fair bargainers, most foreign practitioners regard the United States as a hegemonic 
power that is less concerned to negotiate than it is to persuade, sermonize, or browbeat 
negotiating counterparts into acceding to American positions.141 While Americans are 
often perceived to be aggressive at the negotiating table, Graham’s research reveals that 
other cultures also use aggressive persuasive tactics. However, he found that “Americans 
appear to being using aggressive persuasive tactics earlier.”142 The perception that 
Americans are unwilling to compromise was found to be false as well. Graham found that 
Americans “tended to make larger initial concessions” and “were more apt to offer a 
“fair” price, one that was closer to the eventual solution.”143 The perception of being 
unwilling to compromise is therefore motivated by the decreased bargaining range 
available to American negotiators based on their initial proximity to “fair price.” The old 
adage “time is money” is most definitely an American perspective. Adler and Graham 
note that Americans expect negotiations to take place in a timely fashion, with few 
delays, and shorter decision making time than their Asian counterparts.144 With reference 
to American negotiators perception of time, the U.S. Institute of Peace notes, that 
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American negotiators “enter a negotiation with their own timeframe and usually press for 
an early agreement, especially if the issue at stake has political significance at home.”145 
Lastly, the U.S. Institute of Peace notes that American negotiators “tend to be blunt and 
legalistic while employing a conceptual vocabulary drawn from such diverse fields as 
labor relations, Christian theology, and sports.” Lastly, they note that American 
negotiators “are uncomfortable with silence and ignore body language.” 
C. CHINESE/AMERICAN CULTURE COMPARISON – MATCH OR 
MISMATCH? 
In the previous chapter, we defined our indicators for identifying the amount of 
cultural match or mismatch among negotiation partners. Figure 7 gives us a visual 
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Figure 7.   Chinese/American Culture Comparison – Match or Mismatch? 
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Some of these indicators, such as type of political system, geographical proximity 
or distance, and individualist or collectivist, are self-explanatory. The other indicators 
require some further explanation. The first indicator requiring additional explanation is 
high or low context. In the previous chapter, we explained that high context refers to a 
nonverbal and implicit communication style, while low context refers to a much more 
verbal and explicit style typical of individualistic societies. According to Graham, China 
is a high context nation and the U.S. is a low context nation.146 He assumes that the 
fundamental differences in communication methods based on “cultural differences in 
bargaining processes… are potential sources for friction and misunderstandings between 
bargainers.”147 In their conclusions drawn from a study of Chinese/American business 
negotiations, Adler, Brahm and Graham commented that these communication 
differences “were related to how things were said as well as to what was said.”148 They 
go on to explain that these strong contrasts in conversational form and content “are 
generally not consciously perceived by negotiators. Such 'hidden' problems often lead to 
cross-cultural disharmony, prejudices, and feelings of ill will.”149 Pye’s descriptions of 
Chinese and American respectively high and low context attitudes and mannerisms, 
deeply rooted in civic culture, toward the negotiating process itself show us that these 
two cultures experience cultural mismatch.150  
Perceptions of inferiority and superiority refer to each actor’s perception of who 
holds more power in the negotiation scenario and any feelings of inequality that may 
result from that perception. The U.S. Institute of Peace writes:  
Chief among the structural influences is the United States’ position as a 
preeminent international power. The enormous breadth of U.S. global 
interests and the depth of U.S. power, coupled with the increasing linkages 
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between security, economic, environmental, and other concerns, mean that 
the United States plays a leading— indeed, often overwhelming—role in 
numerous negotiating forums.151 
From this excerpt, it is easy to understand how a negotiator might experience feelings of 
inferiority sitting across from American officials at the negotiating table.  
Regarding short-term versus long-term orientation, Adler and Graham point out 
that from the American point of view, “negotiations with Chinese and Japanese are 
exasperatingly long.”152 Conversely, the U.S. Institute of Peace notes that Americans are 
“businesslike concerned (?) to achieve results in the shortest time.” Adler and Graham 
also contend that “different expectations about ‘appropriate’ duration” of negotiations 
may also influence behavior of negotiators from different cultures.153 As such, this 
concept of “appropriate duration of negotiations” definitely comes into play during Sino-
American negotiations.  
Since China is a communist country and the United States is a liberal democracy, 
we can easily conclude that these two nations have strongly divergent political systems. 
Furthermore, the mere definitions of these two types of political systems directly point to 
a collective communist and an individualistic culture associated with a democratic 
Western society. Bercovitch and Elgström found that when conflicts occurred “within the 
same geographical region, and thus presumably between states with some convergent 
perceptions, hopes and fears, the success rate for mediation is 40 percent.”154 However, 
when the disputes involved “countries belonging to different geographical regions, 
mediation’s success rate is only 24 percent.”155 If we apply these indicators in order to  
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compare the U.S. and China, we can see that opposing political systems, opposing 
perspectives (individualist vs. collectivist), and distant geographic regions all spell 
cultural mismatch for Sino-American negotiation attempts. 
If we now take this information and run it through our model, we can see that 
cultural mismatch predominates between the U.S. and the PRC. Figure 8 shows us just 
how extensive that mismatch is. Based on our finding, we can now expect that mediation 























































Figure 8.   The Probability of Successful Mediation Between the U.S. and China Based 
on Cultural Match or Mismatch 
How does this mismatch play out in real negotiations? With our determination 
that these two cultures are extensively mismatched in hand, we can now turn our 
attention toward the two specific episodes in Sino-American negotiations and apply the 
theory we developed. Let us begin by examining the 1999 bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade. 
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VI. THE IMPACT OF CULTURAL MISMATCH ON 
NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR AND OUTCOME: A CLOSE LOOK AT 
TWO NEGOTIATION EPISODES 
We have now established that strong cultural mismatch exists between the U.S. 
and China. Based on that assessment, we also know that successful mediation attempts 
between these two governments are highly unlikely. Negotiations of these types of 
episodes take place “behind closed doors.” Exact details of the interactions at the 
negotiation table itself are often unavailable as “meeting minutes” are not published from 
these types of interactions. However, from the public rhetoric prior, during, and after 
negotiations likes these, we can infer the stance of both sides. Let us now examine two 
episodes of interaction between the two countries to test our hypothesis. 
A. 1999 BOMBING OF THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN BELGRADE - 
BACKGROUND 
On 8 May 1999, believing it was a headquarters building for Milosevic’s forces, a 
U.S. B2 bomber aircraft dropped a bomb on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, 
Yugoslavia, as part of the NATO-conducted air campaign on Kosovo.156 NATO 
personnel responsible for target selection blamed outdated maps and databases for the 
“unfortunate mix-up.”157 Three Chinese citizens in the building that night died and 
numerous others were injured.158  
1. Chinese Perspective 
Understandably, the Chinese government immediately expressed outrage at the 
event calling it a “barbaric attack and a gross violation of Chinese sovereignty.”159 Many 
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Chinese citizens, as well as government officials refused to believe that the bombing was 
accidental.160 When NATO war planners admitted to mistakenly using outdated maps 
and intelligence databases to select targets for the air raid, Chinese officials were very 
vocal about their skepticism. Although the air raid was a NATO sanctioned military 
action, China singled out the U.S. as the culprits as it was an American war plane that 
actually dropped the ammunition. This, in turn, set off a rash of anti-American protests, 
some of which caused extensive damage to the American embassy in China. In their 
analysis of the incident, Lampton and Ewing note Beijing’s three demands of 
Washington following the bombing; “(1) make an open and official apology to Beijing, 
the Chinese people, and the relatives of the Chinese victims; (2) carry out a complete and 
thorough investigation of the attack on China’s embassy in Yugoslavia; and (3) promptly 
publicize the detailed results of the investigation and punish those responsible for the 
attack.”161 Gries explains that from the Chinese perspective, “this was just another 
example of America's ‘compulsive lying’ about the bombing” and that it is somehow “part of 
a larger plan” with a goal to “humiliate the Chinese.”162 
2. U.S. Perspective  
President Clinton and the U.S. government apologized for the tragic incident and 
agreed to pay compensation for the destruction of the Chinese embassy and to the 
victims’ families.163 Many American citizens and government officials believed that the 
anti-American protests were actually state sponsored.164 Peter Gries explained that many 
reports in the American media assessed that “the Chinese people were not genuinely 
angry with (innocent) America; they were, rather, manipulated by Communist 
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propaganda that the bombing was intentional.” He continued by saying that the American 
public also seemed to feel that the Chinese government “failed to tell its citizens that the 
U.S. attack was an accident and that President Clinton has apologized to Beijing.” This 
was evident during a question and answer session following a press conference with then 
Secretary of State, Madeline Albright. She responded to questions regarding Chinese 
government support for anti-American protests as a result of the bombing by saying “In 
terms of the support, the Vice President of China made a statement in which he in fact 
said that the demonstrations could be carried on within legal means. That is definitely an 
indication of their support for what is going on.”165 From the American perspective, 
Gries writes, “the protests were yet another example of the ‘Communist menace’.”166 
3. Negotiation Attempts and Outcomes 
Negotiations began on May 10 when Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan sent 
a note to the U.S. Ambassador which included their four-point list of demands we 
mentioned earlier: “a public and formal apology, a thorough and complete investigation, 
a rapid disclosure of investigation results, and severe punishment of the perpetrators.”167 
Additionally, the Chinese “requested that the United Nations (UN) Security Council 
convene an emergency meeting on the violence” which resulted in the Security Council 
chairman issuing a statement urging “a comprehensive and thorough investigation of the 
bombing.”168 This was followed by a 14 May telephone call between President Bill 
Clinton and President Jiang Zemin where President Clinton apologized and pledged to 
investigate the event and disclose the results.169 President Clinton sent a special envoy, 
Under Secretary of State Thomas R. Pickering to China on 16 June to report the 
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investigation results to the Chinese government. The Under Secretary expressed the U.S.’ 
“regret” and reiterated that the bombing occurred due to grave mistakes by various U.S. 
government agencies. The Chinese denounced this reasoning as being “entirely 
unconvincing and thus unacceptable”170 From 28-30 July, the two nations convened a 
round of negotiations in Beijing to determine “the compensation for China’s human 
casualties and property losses.” This round of discussions proved successful. “In mid-
August the U.S. government paid compensation in the amount of $4.5 million to the 
Chinese government for loss of life.”171 After an additional round of negotiations, on 16 
Dec, a Department of State spokesman announced, “We will seek funding in Congress so 
that we can provide $28 million for damages to the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The 
Chinese have agreed to pay for damage to U.S. facilities in China in the amount of $2.87 
million.”172  
Gries explains, that for the Chinese “Indemnities seem important not as monetary 
compensation, but as a public punishment that symbolically restores China to its proper 
status.”173 Additionally, he notes that “the anger that Chinese displayed toward America 
during the bombing protests, similarly, sought to restore national self-esteem or mianzi 
(face).”174 
4. Did Cultural Mismatch Have An Effect on the Conduct of 
Negotiations and the Outcome of This Event? 
Let us now refer back to our side by side comparison of Chinese and American 
culture, seen in Figure 9. From this chart we have deduced that cultural mismatch exists.  
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If we apply the details of the 1999, Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade to this model 
it quickly becomes clear that cultural mismatch affected the negotiation behavior and 
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Figure 9.   Chinese/American Culture Comparison – Match or Mismatch? 
We can look to the public statements of each nation to see the stark difference in 
communication styles. The Chinese government, representing a high context culture, 
spoke more generally about the incident simply stating that this was an atrocity and that it 
believed the U.S. was at fault. The U.S., on the other hand, a low context culture, was 
quick to investigate and report the details of the findings. The administration went into 
great detail about why it had made the mistake, what it thought the building was, and why 
it had come to that conclusion.  
China’s view that this was one of many events perpetrated by the U.S. in an 
attempt to humiliate it is an excellent example of its long-term orientation. The Chinese 
had not forgiven or forgotten past events they believed were also designed to humiliate 
their country. Therefore, this bombing brought back to the surface all the ill-will of those 
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past events. The U.S., on the other hand, dealt with this event as a single, individual case, 
of course also trying to play its significance down. For Americans, when an event is 
resolved, it is laid to rest. Additionally, the Chinese refusal to accept the investigation 
results as being an accidental mistake shows another example of their long-term 
orientation. In an effort to quickly resume normal relations between the two nations, the 
U.S. tried to resolve the matter by agreeing to and accomplishing all of the Chinese terms 
for negotiation. The Chinese were willing to draw out negotiations in hopes of attaining 
more favorable investigation results. Ultimately, after several more rounds of 
negotiations, the Chinese acquiesced on this point in order to normalize relations and 
“immediately resume and continue a constructive bilateral relationship oriented toward 
the twenty-first century.”175 
As shown in our diagram, the Chinese and American cultures are situated in 
opposing political systems. For most Americans, the mysterious perception of 
“communism” shaped their attitudes of the events surrounding the anti-American 
demonstrations that took place in China following the bombing. It was assumed that 
because the nation was communist, these protests must have been government sponsored.  
The strongest examples of cultural mismatch in this episode occur in the Chinese 
perception of superiority vs. inferiority. Specifically, Gries points to indemnities being 
not only for financial compensation but also to provide “public punishment that 
symbolically restores China to its proper status.”176 Feeling that they had “lost face” in 
the eyes of the nations of the world when the U.S. bombed their embassy, the Chinese 
protests and demands were all designed to readjust the power balance. It is also worth 
noting that the U.S. and NATO air campaign in Kosovo took place despite stark Chinese 
opposition to it in the UN Security Council. When the U.S. and NATO chose to act  
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without the full support of the UN Security Council, they were able to get around the 
Chinese veto power and thereby belittled the Chinese power status in this pivotal 
international organization.177  
B. EP3 INCIDENT - BACKGROUND 
On the morning of April 1, 2001, news broadcasts around the world were buzzing 
with a juicy bit of news regarding U.S. – China relations.178 An American EP-3 
surveillance aircraft, flying in international airspace off the Chinese coast, had collided 
with a Chinese fighter.179 The Chinese aircraft and pilot crashed into the sea while the 
larger U.S. aircraft, although it sustained some damage, was able to treacherously make 
its way to a Chinese air force base on Hainan Island. The 24 crewmembers were detained 
pending an investigation into the incident.180 Therefore, began 11 days of tense 
negotiations between American and Chinese officials “over the detention of the crew, 
responsibility for the collision, and compensation.”181 
If you refer your attention to Figure 10, you will notice that the EP-3’s flight plan 
followed the Chinese coast coming from the Taiwan Strait down toward China’s 
southeastern coast. International waters and airspace begin 12 nautical miles from the 
coast. Therefore, the collision that occurred approximately 70 nautical miles off China’s 
coast was well into international airspace. It was not until the American aircraft sought a 
safe place to land that it entered into Chinese airspace.  
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Figure 10.   Graphic Depicting the EP-3 Incident of 1 Apr 2001182 
1. The Chinese Perspective 
China was outraged by the U.S. reconnaissance flight.183 It felt that it was 
unlawful for any nation to “spy” on another nation. Beijing essentially held the detained 
crew and the surveillance aircraft with all of its potential intelligence as ransom for an 
apology.184 Chinese officials claimed, “the direct cause to the crash of the Chinese plane 
is the U.S. plane violated flying regulations by suddenly turning toward the Chinese 
planes and bumping into one of the planes.”185 Based on this perspective, China 
demanded that the U.S. not only accept full responsibility for the incident, but also 
compensation for Chinese damages.  
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2. The American Perspective 
The Americans maintained that they were well within their legal rights as they 
were flying in international airspace. President Bush called for the “prompt and safe 
return of the crew, and the return of the aircraft without further damaging or 
tampering.”186 Furthermore, Admiral Blair of the U.S. Pacific Command made public 
statements suggesting that although this was an unfortunate accident, the incident 
reflected a “pattern of increasingly unsafe behavior” by the Chinese military aircraft.187 
He went on to explain that “intercepts by Chinese fighters over the past couple months 
had become more aggressive to the point that we felt they were endangering the safety of 
the Chinese and American aircraft.”188 In response to the Chinese accusations that the 
large surveillance aircraft turned into the Chinese fighter, Admiral Blair was quoted as 
saying “Big airplanes like [an EP-3] fly straight and level on their path, little airplanes zip 
around them.”189 He went on to say, “Under international air space rules, the faster more 
maneuverable aircraft has obligation to stay out of the way of the slower aircraft. It's 
pretty obvious who bumped into who.”190 
3. Negotiation Attempts and Outcomes 
Lampton and Ewing explain the details and intricacies of the negotiation process 
that followed. They begin by recounting that then Secretary of State Colin Powell was 
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the Chinese plane did not get down safely, and we regret the loss of that Chinese pilot.” 
191 This was quickly followed with a letter expressing his “regret” over the loss of the 
Chinese pilot.192 Lampton and Ewing go on to explain the specifics of the letter. 
Powell’s remarks were translated as yihan, or regret, and did not satisfy 
Beijing, which was still looking for a full apology. On April 11 in Beijing, 
Ambassador Prueher delivered a letter in English (without a copy 
translated into Chinese and signed by the U.S. ambassador) that stated, 
‘Both President Bush and Secretary of State Powell have expressed their 
sincere regret over your missing pilot and aircraft. . . . Please convey to the 
Chinese people . . . that we are very sorry for their loss. . . . We are very 
sorry the entering of Chinese airspace and the landing did not have verbal 
clearance.’ Although the word apology was not used in the English, the 
Chinese stretched the English words into an apology in Chinese. The 
double very sorry was translated by the Chinese as shenbiao qianyi, which 
means “a deep expression of apology or regret.” However, the U.S. 
embassy subsequently translated very sorry as feichang wanxi, which 
indicates an expression of great sympathy but not an apology. The 
embassy version also used feichang baoqian, or “extremely sorry.” For 
better or worse, the verbal dexterity allowed China to claim a U.S. 
apology and release the crew to fly home on April 12, while the United 
States insists it never apologized.193 
Peter Gries explained that “the political fall-out from the mid-air collision” 
between the two aircraft “suggests that the 1999 Belgrade bombing was indeed a turning 
point in Sino-American relations. Chinese America-bashers related the incident to the 
Belgrade bombing and saw it as evidence that Americans were again killing and 
humiliating Chinese. American China-bashers, meanwhile, pointed to the Belgrade 
bombing protests to argue that Chinese tyranny was again resurgent.”194 
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While the aircrew returned home safely, the aircraft remained in China. 195 The 
U.S. and China continued bickering over who would foot the bill for the various damages 
incurred on both sides. Several months later, the U.S. surveillance aircraft was returned to 
the United States in pieces.196 Chinese demands for nearly $1 million were ignored. The 
U.S. eventually sent a check for $34,567, which it deemed, was “fair value” for any 
services the Chinese provided.197 
4. Did Cultural Mismatch Have An Effect on the Conduct of 
Negotiations and the Outcome of This Event? 
Let us now refer back to our side by side comparison of Chinese and American 
culture, seen in Figure 11. From this chart we have deduced that cultural mismatch exists. 
If we apply the details of the 2001 EP-3 Incident to this model, it quickly becomes clear 
that cultural mismatch affected the negotiation behaviors and outcome of this event. 
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Figure 11.   Chinese/American Culture Comparison – Match or Mismatch? 
We can look to the public statements of each nation to see the stark difference in 
communication styles. China, a high context culture, spoke more generally about the 
incident simply stating that there was an accident and that it believed the U.S. was at 
fault. The U.S., on the other hand, was quick to disseminate details of the event. 
Moreover, the Chinese perception of superiority and inferiority definitely came into play. 
Perceiving that they had “lost face” in the eyes of the nations of the world when the U.S. 
violated their airspace, they repeatedly insisted that the U.S. accept full responsibility 
with an apology and extensive compensation. The fact that Secretary Powell’s letter was 
sent only in English only served to further the Chinese perception of American arrogance. 
Conversely, the U.S., feeling it had “the moral high ground” and international law on its 
side, demonstrated its sentiment of superiority by not only refusing to issue an official 
apology, but also completely ignoring Chinese financial estimates of damages and instead 
choosing to compensate only what it deemed appropriate, a mere fraction of Chinese 
demands. While U.S. officials were well aware of the “loose” translation of Secretary 
Powell’s letter given to the Chinese people, the U.S. did nothing to correct the 
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misunderstanding. Lastly, this result of this episode demonstrates the cultural mismatch 
between the two nations when it comes to long term vs. short term orientation. After only 
four months, the U.S. had its crew returned safely, its surveillance aircraft returned in 
pieces, political rhetoric had subsided, and remittances for “damages,” albeit a fraction of 
the amount requested from China, were paid. The U.S. was done dealing with the issue as 
it was considered resolved. China, on the other hand, continued unsuccessfully to push 
for additional compensation for several years to come. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Armed with all the new information and revelations presented in this thesis, the 
scenario we presented at the beginning now takes on new meaning with increased 
understanding. As one of five representatives from the United States attending 
negotiations with Chinese businessmen, you are now more culturally prepared for the 
interactions about to take place. You now realize that even after almost an hour of 
waiting, it is crucial to remain calm and fight the urge to show frustration by continually 
checking your watch and sighing aloud. You now understand that when the leader of the 
Chinese delegation arrives and suggests sharing a meal before beginning negotiations it is 
an integral part of their understanding of negotiations. Insisting on beginning negotiations 
right away only reaffirms their stereotypes about American arrogance at the negotiating 
table. 
If the Chinese delegates were also to learn from the information presented in this 
thesis, perhaps they would try to be more punctual, straightforward, and decisive at the 
negotiating table. This revised narrative gives examples of how both sides could make 
small concessions on process, not even substance, in order to be more culturally sensitive 
to their counterparts, thereby enabling an atmosphere that is conducive to fruitful and 
trustful negotiations. Demonstration of cultural understanding might ameliorate 
negotiation attempts and smooth an otherwise stressful and combative process.  
Nation-states often enter into negotiations as a, sometimes final attempt to resolve 
their differences in a diplomatic forum rather than resorting to combative retaliation. 
These negotiations can be protracted and tenuous, especially when the disputing parties 
come from different cultures. This thesis has shown that all too often, culture is a 
neglected aspect of conflict resolution. Cultural mismatch and misunderstanding are 
additional confounding factors that complicate communication and create misperceptions 




approach negotiations with a clear understanding of the impact of cross-cultural 
understanding and communication on the conflict resolution process, the parties might 
find negotiations are smoother and resolution comes easier. 
This thesis has attempted to merge two fields of study that, until now, have been 
left virtually separate in the academic community and largely understudied: conflict 
resolution and cross-cultural communication. The overall question that this thesis sought 
to address is: What is the role of culture in the conflict resolution process, specifically in 
international negotiations. It is a rather broad question that first of all aims at getting an 
overview as to the major effects of culture on conflict resolution, which is a prerequisite 
for further in-depth studies.  
The thesis began by laying out the conceptual foundation of both conflict 
resolution and culture/cross-cultural communication. It mainly concentrated on 
negotiations in international relations and also touched upon international mediation, as 
one major activity in the conflict resolution field. This discussion started out with 
conceptualizing key terms and theories associated with both fields of study. Once this 
foundational understanding of the two fields was laid and a concept was forwarded on 
how to identify and measure cultural match or mismatch among negotiation partners, we 
examined two case studies in U.S.-China relations that served to test the concept.  
A.  THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
The basic assumption of this thesis was that the significance of culture in conflict 
resolution is still politically underrated and academically under-explored, with the effect 
that negotiations fail and opportunities for successful international mediation are missed. 
In this thesis, we have discovered that just like our cultural Matryoshka doll, civic culture 
is at the core of a nation’s political culture and strategic culture. Analyses of a culture at 
any of these individual levels without an understanding of its civic culture, just as the 
individual dolls themselves, would be incomplete. Civic culture is the core. It is from the 
core of civic culture that the individual political actors derive their customs, manners, and 
forms of social organization which guide their day to day relations with others. All of 
their knowledge, beliefs, morals, customs, habits, and adherence to laws play into their 
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interactions both domestically with other politicians, as well as internationally when 
representing their nation on the world stage, especially at the negotiating table. It is in 
this way that culture plays a significant role in the interactions of actors at the negotiation 
table. 
In this thesis, we argued that the impact of culture on negotiation and mediation 
can be measured by transferring a concept from constructivist norm diffusion research. 
As they look at the match or mismatch of international and domestic norms, we looked at 
the cultural match or mismatch of negotiating parties. We then developed our own 
indicators of cultural match or mismatch, building on Hofestede, Berchovitch and 
Elgström’s research and adding insights from cross-cultural communication. The 
following six variables, formulated as dichotomies, we identified as most relevant: high 
context vs. low context, individualism vs. collectivism, perceptions of superiority vs. 
inferiority, long term vs. short term orientation, geographical proximity vs. distance and 
democratic vs. authoritarian regimes. We then created our own model indicating how 
cultural match or mismatch might lead us to deduce the probability of successful 
mediation attempts. Based on the number and quality of matches the two cultures have in 
common, we can then deduce the likelihood of successful mediation attempts. The 
underlying hypothesis is that cultural mismatch is one major cause for mediation failure 
which can be observed ‘at work’, even if causality cannot be stringently established. 
Cultural match thus increases the relative likelihood of success in negotiation, without of 
course guaranteeing it.  
B.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Peter Gries wrote, “Until Chinese and Americans learn to affirm rather than 
threaten each other's self-concepts, their common interest in a stable Asia Pacific will not 
be sufficient to ensure peace in the 21st century.”198 This quote underscores the  
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importance of cultural understanding in diplomatic negotiations. As such, in-depth 
cultural training and language training should be required of any American representative 
to international negotiations. 
Events following September 11th highlighted the personnel and capability gap in 
both language and cultural understanding. Since that time, the military services have 
begun to acknowledge and develop new programs to address the need to raise personnel 
with extensive foreign language and regional political-military understanding. However, 
the time needed to gain in-depth insight into regional issues, not to mention the 
complexities of acquiring the foreign language capabilities of this type, is both lengthy 
and costly. The funding required to mount these programs, which need to be long-term 
and institutionalized to be effective, is often an obstacle. It would be worthwhile for the 
military to expand its investments in developing a future force of personnel trained and 
poised to handle these issues. 
If we were to carry these same lessons over, to look toward the American 
education system, it can also be said that in order to better prepare our youth, and to 
ensure a future of peace, language and cultural awareness training should also be 
expanded. This would not only ease some of the cultural tensions many schools systems 
now face, but also ensure that as adults, they will be better prepared to handle cross-
cultural negotiations throughout the rest of their lives. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are many areas that could be explored in order to further our understanding 
of the role of culture in conflict resolution. In this thesis, we concluded that the likelihood 
of negotiation failure increases with the intensity of mismatch. However, we did not get 
into the relative weight of these mismatching variables, some of which overlap, as well as 
into causal pathways. Therefore, this would be an excellent prospect for further research. 
Another aspect bracketed here was the effect of cultural mismatch in mediation. 
Once a third party enters a dispute, it brings in its own cultural background, which is 
often quite distinct from the one of the disputants. Analyzing the impact of culture on a  
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triadic relationship is challenging, though. It is supposed here that cultural mismatch 
between mediators and disputants is a serious source of negotiation and mediation failure, 
too, a hypothesis that would require more complex research designs. 
Finally, as demonstrated by our cultural match or mismatch discussion, a 
comparative analysis of two cultures in negotiations is quite helpful in understanding the 
dynamics at the negotiation table. It would be useful to continue this type of research in 
order to compare negotiating styles, behavior and perceptions of the other at the 
negotiating table. The more we know about the negotiation records, including non-verbal 
communication, the better cases are suited to measure the impact of cultural match and 
mismatch on negotiation behavior and outcomes. Comparative studies comparing cases 
of match and mismatch appear to be particularly rewarding.  
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